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Introduction
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have been, and continue to be, a significant part of the United State Air Force. While their initial development was slowed by the Air Force's focus on the manned strategic bomber, for the last three decades of the Cold War ICBMs steadily supplanted bombers as the Air Force's main contribution to the national nuclear deterrent posture. Now, the land-based missile force is receiving upgrades and the Air Force is planning an ICBM modernization program. Also, a recent Department of Defense nuclear policy review outlined the expected existence of ICBMs for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the relevance of ICBMs to the nation is not wholly clear to some. The numbers and types of nuclear arms continue to be negotiated away, and there is some academic discussion on the continued need to invest in the traditional strategic force construct-the nuclear triad.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to outline the issues surrounding ICBMs of which the Air Force should be aware. Given the Air Force's contributions to the nation's defense, as articulated by Global Engagement's core competencies, examining the intersections with the ICBM weapon system is integral to this research. Specifically, identifying the issues from which Air Force policymakers can better address the relevance of ICBMs is this paper's goal.
Essentially, can the Air Force serve the nation better by divesting itself of a Cold War relic-the silo-based, nuclear tipped, intercontinental ballistic missile? Or, does the descendant of the German V-2 still offer a means for the Air Force to defend the nation throughout the twenty-first century?
To address the above issues, the paper will begin by addressing various background issues associated with ICBMs in general. It will first look at the arguments for ridding the inventory of ICBMs. This position is largely articulated by proponents of general nuclear disarmament, as well as by those who believe stability and deterrence in a nuclear world can be increased without ICBMs. Then, the research will turn to US strategic guidance, looking for implicit and explicit words with respect to the ICBM's future.
Chapter Two will examine current USAF perspectives on the ICBM. This will include covering stated ICBM modernization requirements, both from a traditional nuclear aspect as well as looking at the relevance of conventional warhead-equipped ICBMs. The intent is to find out how the USAF has articulated its future needs and whether there is relevance for ICBMs. It will also examine some of the issues related to a conventional warhead-equipped ICBM.
Finally, Chapter Three will conclude by examining how the USAF historically approached ICBM development. This will include recognizing that there is a historical basis for USAF corporate neglect of the ICBM development, one that contributed to Carl Builder's indictment of the Air Force's stewardship of airpower in The Icarus Syndrome. The paper will conclude by providing recommendations for Air Force leaders to consider in the coming years as the issue of ICBM relevance invariably becomes prominent.
Chapter 2

Contextual Background Relevant to the ICBM
In addressing ICBM relevance, several issues come to the fore. On one hand are the pressures associated with disarmament and deterrence, two areas often contradicted by each other's conflicting fundamental precepts. Another key contextual area is in national security guidance, a review of which reveals considerations staking the claim for ICBM relevance.
Disarmament, the Triad and the ICBM
Nuclear disarmament ebbs and wanes as a topic within public discourse. Several years ago, General George Butler well illustrated the contemporary nuclear abolitionist movement when, shortly after retiring as Commander in Chief of Strategic Command, he vocally proclaimed "the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons" as a top imperative. 1 The issue further came to the fore in the late 1990s, when prominent military officials from 17 countries called the continued existence of nuclear weapons a "peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people (they) are dedicated to protect." With respect to ICBMs, the connection to nuclear disarmament has been both indirect as well as direct. Indirectly, it is generally argued by proponents of nuclear disarmament that a weapon system built specifically to deliver nuclear munitions is no longer relevant. For example, in 1995 Australia sponsored an international commission which presented the United Nations with a roadmap for abolishing nuclear weapons. Known as "The Report of the Canberra
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," it called into doubt the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and postulated that accidental or purposeful use was a likely by-product of maintaining nuclear weapons. Further, it outlined several indirect measures such as taking nuclear forces off of alert postures as well as removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. 3 From a direct perspective, within the context of a nuclear disarmament debate the discussion of ICBMs has largely revolved around one aspect-elimination. More specifically, it is generally the arms control community which ends up supporting the abolitionists by questioning the continued relevance of ICBMs. In this case, however, the arguments are less emotional and more practical, and center on the subject of the nuclear triad.
The cold war's nuclear triad, consisting of land-and sea-based missiles as well as manned bombers, was largely considered an essential component of US (and Soviet) nuclear force posture. It was the "interaction of the three US strategic forces elements, often referred to as the "synergism" of the TRIAD, (which complicated) Soviet attack calculations…(increasing) the overall effectiveness of the US force as a deterrent." 4 The triad has been a steadfast facet and-as will be seen is a subsequent section-while redefined, will remain an integral part of the US military.
At the same time, the triad has occasionally come into question. In 1980, for example, an
Institute for Policy Analysis Special Report on the Future of Land-based Strategic Forces noted:
"The existence of the triad is largely accidental, a product of the impetus given during the latter years of the Eisenhower Administration and during the Kennedy Administration to the augmentation of strategic nuclear forces. As such, there is nothing sacred about it. There are, however, reasons for maintaining a mixture or various types of forces, whether this mixture follows the present pattern or a different one." 5 Few concrete efforts were made to restructure the triad, although nuclear force policy decisions occasionally considered alternatives to the basic triad. For example, in the first nuclear policy review since the 1970s-the Clinton Administration's 1994 Nuclear Posture Review-at least one major figure advocated scrapping the ICBM force. 6 Today, the leading voices questioning the need for maintaining a triad-based force come mainly from the arms control community.
Stephen Cimbala tackles the triad in several recent books about 21 st century nuclear forces.
In chapters titled "Triad and Tribulation" and "Triage of Triads," he addresses the maintenance of nuclear triads as a key question for US (and Russian) defense planners and arms controllers.
Cimbala considers the triad an "accepted truism" of the Cold War, and ultimately concludes that political, military, economic and other reasons can argue for and against triads, dyads (two nuclear legs), and monads (one leg). In general, he concludes: "A dyad of US bomber-delivered weapons and submarine-launched missiles fulfills the requirements of assured destruction and target coverage…as well as a triad does." 7 For every viewpoint advocating triad realignment, one can find the opposite perspective.
For example, the October 1998 Defense Science Board formed a task force to look at nuclear deterrence; its observation on the triad's relevance was resounding. Overall, it considered the triad "highly stabilizing" and "well worth the price." With respect to the ICBM force, it particularly saw this leg as increasing in relative value as well as offering high stability.
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st Century Deterrence
Contemporary discussions of deterrence also make a good case for the continued relevance of ICBMs. More precisely, it is the match between deterrence requirements generated by 21 st century threats and attributes associated with ICBMs that support the latter's continuing relevance.
Daniel Goure addresses the issue of modern deterrence in a Policy Review article titled "Nuclear Deterrence, Then and Now." He outlines a premise that the original rationale for US nuclear force development has eroded, while recent doctrinal shifts by the Bush Administration on the role of nuclear weapons have left a void in deterrence theory. He thus proposes several key roles for strategic nuclear forces, including "hold at risk those targets that are most highly prized by a potential adversary but that are not accessible by conventional means" and "neutralize a proliferator's WMD." 9 Similarly, Keith Payne in "Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age" argues:
US deterrence policies must be ready to address a wide range of threats. Defense planners concerned about deterrence can no longer afford the luxury of concentrating primarily on one enemy. The US military capabilities suited to deterring across a wide spectrum of challengers may be quite varied with regard to both the type of force-use threatened and the targets selected…In some cases, a conventional threat may be suitable; in others, deterrence may require a proportional nuclear, chemical or biological threat; in still others, a grossly disproportional threat may be needed. 10 The key point from the above is that deterrence is still applicable in the foreseeable future.
Just as important is the recognition that the threat drives the deterrence needs. 
National Security Guidance and the ICBM
A survey of contemporary national security guidance and doctrine for explicit and implicit mention of ICBMs is important in forecasting their relevance. As far as direct references, these are few; indirectly, however, much can be interpreted from the documents in terms of how US national security will rely upon the ICBM weapon system.
National Security Strategy
The capstone document is "The National The most germane deals with preventing weapons of mass destruction threats to the US and its allies/friends. In this section one finds an outline of the threat (rogue states and terrorists possessing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, along with ballistic missile technology), as well as a prescribed US response (centering around the much-publicized notion of preemption).
Specifically, the NSS calls for "proactive counterproliferation efforts" which in turn rely on aspects such as counterforce capabilities able to "prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries." 15 To further support preemptive options, the NSS also seeks "to continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results." 16 This last aspect is also reflected in the eighth means/strategy, which specifically deals with "Transforming America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and
Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century." Here the sub-objectives are to assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. Again the mention of any specific means to achieve this is absent; what is visible is the notion that no aspect of the US military is sacred, for "The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed." 17 At the same time, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." 
Quadrennial Defense Review
Published shortly after 9/11, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) offers little direct intersection with ICBMs. The most straightforward aspect is the reference to a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); mandated by Congress, the NPR was to "describe the size, structure, and posture of the nation's nuclear forces and the contribution they can make to deterrence in the coming decades." For offensive weapons, the attribute of long-range precision strike comes to the fore in the QDR's section on defense strategy. It calls for "the ability to project power at long ranges (which) helps to deter threats to the United States and, when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at a distance." 21 This facet is coupled with numerous calls for rapid reaction capabilities. For example, in the section on "Major Combat Operations," the QDR states for US forces "the focus will be on the ability to act quickly when challenged" and, in a combination of the two facets of speed and precision, the QDR notes "US forces will fight from a forward deterrent posture with immediately employable forces, including long-range precision strike capabilities from within and beyond the theater, and rapidly deployable maneuver capabilities."
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Further, the QDR mentions "Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains," 23 which again points out the need for long-range, precision strike.
It also notes in the section on denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement, that "emphasis must be placed on manned and unmanned long-range precision strike assets, related initiatives for new small munitions, and the ability to defeat hard and deeply buried targets."
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Annual Defense Report
The Secretary of Defense produces an "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," also known as the Annual Defense Report (ADR). It is a statutory requirement and is intended to outline how the Department of Defense developed its capabilities and intends to maintain and improve them in the future. Over the last decade the ADR has been specific in its discussion of ICBM issues; key excerpts will help understand senior-level direction concerning the nuclear force structure and posture.
The 1995 Annual Defense Report includes a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which built on the QDR of 1993. Several key themes emerged from the NPR, including the views that while "nuclear weapons are playing a smaller role in US security than at any other time in the nuclear age," and that "the United States requires a much smaller nuclear arsenal under present circumstances," there is still uncertainty concerning denuclearization and the US therefore must maintain some nuclear forces as a hedge against uncertainty.
NPR examined options for strategic nuclear force structures and re-examined the concept of a triad; the NPR rejected a minimal force that eliminated ICBMs and "determined (a triad) remains valid for a START II-size force." 26 Further, it stated:
Today, the United States relies on fewer types of nuclear weapon systems than in the past. Hedging against system failure of a leg of a triad --either because of technical failure of a delivery platform or warhead, or technological breakthroughs by potential adversaries --is a primary reason to retain a triad. Each leg also has unique characteristics and specific advantages.
27
While the decision was made to maintain the traditional nuclear triad at START II force levels, it's important to note ICBM elimination came to the fore in this first review of nuclear policy in the post-Cold War era.
At the same time, another relevant and recurring theme surfaces in the ADR-the need to sustain an industrial base for strategic missiles, reentry systems, and guidance systems. As such, the 1995 ADR recommended re-motoring and replacing the guidance system on Minuteman IIIs, and fund the sustainment of the guidance and reentry vehicle industrial base.
"A significant challenge in future planning will be to ensure the continued viability of the industrial base needed to maintain and modify deployed strategic ballistic missiles. For the first time since the late 1970s --when Minuteman procurement was essentially complete and Peacekeeper development was just beginning --the United States is not developing or producing any land-based ballistic missiles. Furthermore, development of a new ICBM is not anticipated for at least 15 years…The Department is also exploring new ways to preserve key industrial technologies; reentry vehicle and guidance technology are particularly problematic, given the lack of commercial applications…The budget…will ensure the United States retains an industrial capability to address guidance system problems and design prototype systems." The ADR and the NPR-related releases offer several direct and indirect mentions dealing with ICBMs; considering that the NPR is intended to develop a strategic posture for the 21 st century, the following paragraphs will likely offer the most official nuclear force guidance available outside of classified channels.
Nuclear Posture Review
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's summary letter identifies several highlights of the NPR.
The first is the adherence of strategic forces to the overall defense guidance of capabilities-based planning. With respect to nuclear forces, this approach means maintaining over the coming decades "a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with US and allied security." chapter will address intercontinental conventional strike, and it will also serve as a transition to the final chapter dealing with how the USAF initially approached ICBM development.
Intercontinental Strike--Requirements
Today, the Air Force generally eschews describing its capabilities in terms of individual weapons, favoring instead a focus on achieving battlespace effects. This effects-based viewpoint is usually associated with operations, and is also increasingly prominent in the development of new weapons. Evidence of this approach can be found in two areas related to the ICBM: the call for a new land-based strategic nuclear deterrent, and numerous studies dealing with long-range strike. Both are relevant to the future of the current ICBM force.
Land-based Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
In January 2002, Air Force Space Command developed a Mission Need Statement (MNS)
for a land-based strategic nuclear deterrent. As a capstone acquisition document, the MNS is intended to broadly outline the requirement for a new (or improved) weapon system. In this case, the MNS builds upon national-level guidance endorsing a continued reliance on land-based nuclear weapons to deter and, if needed, defeat aggression against the US.
The MNS identifies a range of capabilities the US will require in the 2020 timeframe as the current ICBM force ends its post-modernization lifespan. In particular, it states:
…a future credible land-based strategic nuclear deterrent force must be capable of rapidly holding at risk a wide range of surface and subsurface targets to include, but not limited to, fixed soft and hard targets; hard and deeply buried targets; chemical and biological production, storage, and delivery system facilities, strategic relocatable targets; heavily defended targets, and targets that emerge unexpectedly on short notice. 1 The MNS then goes on to discuss several hardware options to fulfill the above requirements.
In particular, it sees as feasible two material alternatives: a Minuteman-based variant, and a new missile system. Both are to provide "on-demand force application, flexible force application, and flexible effects," with attributes centering on the ability to precisely deliver a variety of warheads to achieve a variety of effects. 2 As figure 1 shows, the MNS anticipates a variety of requirements for the future ICBM, including traditional nuclear force needs (promptness, accuracy, survivability) and evolving needs such as deep earth penetration, the ability to deliver varied munitions, and global range and azimuth-all considerations which intersect with USAF long-range strike requirements. and Logistics is sponsoring a forthcoming effort to begin this summer. Specifically, a Defense Science Board task force is charged with addressing the evolution of nuclear and non-nuclear forces, including the role of ICBMs, particularly as they relate to Strategic Command's global strike mission. 4 At the same time, the Air Force has several efforts refining long-range strike needs. One is the November 2001 Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper, which reaffirmed the role of the manned bomber. This study called for a power projection capability built on the current bomber force structure (with planned modernization) extending into the 2035 timeframe. 5 However, the paper also acknowledged:
"It is likely that the next generation of long-range strike platforms and weapons will rely on revolutionary technology. The Air Force is actively engaged in analysis of the path to retain the best attributes of our current platforms (payload, range, and flexibility) while achieving stealth in all dimensions and improving our responsiveness and effectiveness against the full spectrum of potential targets." 6 A second effort is what Air Force Magazine reported as the Long-Range Strike Study-a key point being it is titled sans "aircraft". The Air Force is using desired effects and capabilities, vice a platform-based approach, to determine the solutions for global strike needs. This study is not assuming the solution will be a manned aircraft. Rather, options including orbital, suborbital, exoatmospheric, aircraft or missile systems, and manned or unmanned platforms are being considered to meet underlying requirements such as speed, stealth, precision, and flexibility. "To further increase impact speed and thus penetration depth, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) equipped with conventional penetrator warheads, rather than with nuclear weapons, are the most promising option. Such missiles can easily achieve the necessary impact speed for maximum penetration; in fact, braking mechanisms will likely be necessary to ensure that their payload does not impact at speeds too high for the warhead to withstand. Existing ICBMs can deliver one-ton payloads, implying that a single converted ICBM might be able to deliver several BLU-116-type penetrators." 
Birth Of the ICBM During the USAF's Infancy
According to Edmund Beard, author of a prize-winning work-"Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics"-"a general emphasis on manned bomber systems (or on missile types that did not threaten them) with a slow, conservative approach to ballistic missiles persisted within the Air Force." 2 As early as 1945, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, General Hap Arnold, well articulated this perspective:
Improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion, and electronic control will enable unmanned devices to transport means of destruction to targets at distances up to many thousands of miles. However, until such time as guided missiles are so developed that there is no further need for manned aircraft, research in the field of "conventional" aircraft of improved design must be vigorously pursued. 3 The low emphasis on missile development spanned the immediate post-World War II period until the mid-1950s, and is attributable to several key factors. One of the most important was the level of funding, particularly for research and development. In the latter years of World War II and immediately after, the US military's resources were sufficient to fund exploitation and reverse engineering of German rockets, as well as various stages of development of over twenty different missile programs. However, the nation did not sustain high military expenditures shortly after V-E and V-J days, and the Air Force (as did all of DoD) found itself slashing research and development dollars for the sake of sustaining its fielded forces. 4 Little changed in this regard with the increased defense spending brought on by the Korean War, as funds were generally directed toward weapons fielding and operational costs.
A second factor was the issue of technology, which in the late-1940s was seen as a limiting aspect for viably fielding ballistic missiles. Issues such as not having fuels of high specific impulse, high temperatures during atmospheric re-entry, and atomic weapon warhead weights contributed to conventional wisdoms which didn't expect ballistic missiles of intercontinental ranges for a decade or more. 5 In addition to low dollars and technological challenges, ICBMs suffered lack of emphasis because they were considered a distraction from the Air Force's main effort. "In the 1950s, the bomber generals, particularly Curtis LeMay, fought research and development for ICBMs, believing that they were an expensive and unnecessary adjunct to manned bombers. While the Army Air Force had the lead for research and development of air-launched missiles and those missiles relying on aerodynamic lift, the Army Ground Forces had responsibility for ground-launched ballistic and guided missiles. 7 The Air Force fought this policy, primarily on the grounds that it had the overall responsibility for strategic bombing. And while for the foreseeable future manned bombers would fulfill the strategic bombing role, the Air Force …the type of problems and delays that had heretofore beset the American ICBM program generally were eliminated. The ICBM had been designated the highest national priority by Presidential directive. The program was separated from the normal development channels within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. An entirely new agency had been created specifically to manage the ballistic missile programs. Budget requests for the program (were to be submitted) separately from all other service programs…These were striking changes in the normal mode of operations. Their effectiveness was very high and almost totally eliminated the kinds of delays, obstruction, and funding scarcity that had plagued the (ICBM) program in its early years. 
Chapter Conclusion
Thus two key points emerge from the preceding discussion of the ICBM's birth and integration. First, the Air Force has a history of ignoring or at least underemphasizing new and innovative ways of delivering firepower through the air and space medium; and secondly, the Air For the "Precision Engagement" core competency, the Air Force provides overwhelming but discriminating effects; inference also allows one to see the potential benefits of the ICBM as an intercontinental conventional warhead delivery platform.
A current concept known as the "Global Strike Task Force" (GSTF) is the latest operationalization of Global Engagement and its core competencies. General John Jumper, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has touted the GSTF as part of the nation's rapid reaction, "kick down the door" force. Hinging on the precision weapons and stealth of the B-2 and F-22, and enabled by extensive intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, the GSTF is seen as a near-term solution providing "rapid-reaction, leading-edge, power projection…(delivering) massive around-the-clock firepower." 5 Understanding that General Jumper's focus was on developing a concept of operations for near-term systems helps understand why there is no mention of intercontinental strikes by other than manned aircraft in GSTF. However, the concept itself gives hope that if the Air Force is flexible enough to successfully transition the B-2 from Cold
War nuclear bomber to door kicker, then the ICBM (or other weapons) also could be used to fulfill the GSTF or its successor constructs.
Recommendations
The development and integration of the ICBM offers several lessons. Foremost is that the Air Force needs to be attuned to developments concerning the ICBM, not only for what it did in years past ("the single most influential weapon of the 20 th century"), but also on what it can still do to serve the nation's defense.
In terms of theory and doctrine, deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction by a variety of actors (not just the Cold War's singular adversary) and counterproliferation are clearly at the center of US national security concerns. One challenge for future Air Force leaders is to fully incorporate these security concerns, and the attendant contributions of the ICBM, into airpower theory and Air Force doctrine. This is not only needed to avoid Carl Builder's indictment on deterrence theory abrogation, but also to ensure potential new means of airpower (i.e., the conventional warhead-equipped ICBM) are fully integrated into Air Force thinking.
A second recommendation is for the Air Force to be prepared to react to the vagaries of nuclear disarmament. While current national guidance solidifies a nuclear triad, should arms control or disarmament (or even de-nuclearization) pressures build, the ICBM is the most Notes vulnerable of the triad's leg to divestiture. So while delivering nuclear warheads from a landbased silo may someday become unnecessary, the Air Force could profit by employing the idea in a new fashion-namely, to precisely and rapidly deliver other munitions anywhere on the globe, with minimal preparation and cost and with no lives at risk.
Finally, in the coming decades the Air Force may develop and field other weapon systems which will challenge the status quo in the same way the ICBM challenges the post-World War II bombers. For example, unmanned combat aerial vehicles are on the horizon, and the Air Force is also considering delivering firepower from sub-orbital or orbital platforms. The challenge is for the Air Force to learn from the ICBM's initial spurning (and also, one could argue, to learn from the airplane's initial spurning, when the Army relegated it to a reconnaissance vice combat role), and to avoid repeating past mistakes.
Numerous influences will determine the fate of the ICBM in the 21 st century, many of which will be beyond the Air Force's control. However, if history can be considered an event vector, the Air Force will be in the midst of any future ICBM developments, whether in policy formulation or implementation. The challenge is to recognize national security needs and the opportunities an intercontinental ballistic missile presents, and to best integrate the two. 1 Beard, 237-8. 2 Department of the Air Force, "Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21 st Century Air Force." Washington DC: 1996, 1. 3 Ibid., 9. 4 Ibid., 11. 5 General John P. Jumper, "Global Strike Task Force," Airpower Journal, Spring 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ apj01/spr01/jumper.htm.
